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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The  modern  theory  of  capital  structure  began  with  the  path-breaking 
Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) (hereafter MM) propositions, which state that in a 
world with perfect capital markets, the firm value is independent of its financing 
decisions. While these irrelevance propositions offer important insights, they only 
provide benchmarks, not end results (Myers, 2001). The main result of the MM 
theory  is  to  show  under  what  conditions  the  capital  structure  choice  becomes 
irrelevant.  Implicitly,  it  raises  an  important  question  as  under  what  conditions 
corporate financing matters (Harris and Raviv, 1991). Over the last forty years, a 
vast  body  of  research  on  capital  structure  has  advanced  useful  theoretical  and 
empirical models by explicitly relaxing some of the key assumptions underlying the 
MM’s  theorems.  These  attempts  have  led  to  two  predominant  but  competing 
theories of capital structure, known as the trade-off theory and the pecking order 
theory.
1 
The (static) trade-off theory, derived from the models based on taxes (e.g. 
Modigliani and Miller, 1963; DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980) and agency costs (e.g. 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976), suggests the firm has a well-defined optimal capital 
structure, which is determined at the point where the marginal benefit equates the 
marginal cost of using debt.
2 This framework posits that the debt ratio is mean 
reverting as the firm seeks to achieve the optimum. An extensive body of empirical 
research  has  documented  evidence  supporting  the  theory  prediction.  Early  US 
papers by Taggart (1977), Jalilvand and Harris (1984) and Auerbach (1985) find the 
firm debt ratio exhibits a mean revering behaviour. Recent studies by Miguel and 
Pindado (2001), and Fama and French (2002) report mixed results, while research 
by Ozkan (2001), Bhaduri (2002) and Loof (2003), Flannery and Rangan (2004), 
offers  consistent  evidence,  lending  support  to  the  partial  adjustment  model  as 
predicted  by  the  trade-off  framework.  In  other  approaches,  Marsh  (1982)  and 
Hovakimian et al. (2001) estimating a logit model observe that the debt equity 
                                                
 
1 Two recent theoretical developments in the literature include the market-timing hypothesis (Baker 
and Wurgler, 2002) and managerial inertia theory (Welch, 2004). Frank and Goyal (2005) review 
the theories and their criticisms (e.g. Leary and Roberts, 2004a; Kayhan and Titman, 2004) .    
2  Some recent theoretical work on the trade-off framework has focused on developing dynamic 
structural models (e.g. Strebulaev, 2004; and Hennessy and Whited, 2005). 3 
choice reflects a tendency towards the optimum, which is supportive of the trade-
off theory. 
The pecking order theory argues that the firm does not have an optimal mix 
of debt and equity (e.g. Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). The observed 
amount of debt reflects a cumulative result of financing decisions overtime. Due to 
asymmetric information, the capital structure choice follows a pecking order: where 
internal finance is preferred to external finance, in which debt is preferred to equity. 
Past empirical evidence for the pecking order theory has been rare, due to inherent 
difficulties in devising a test for the theory prediction. The earliest direct empirical 
test is due to Baskin (1989), who finds the result consistent with the theory. Using a 
logit model, Helwege and Liang (1996) provide a mixed conclusion, while Haan 
and Hinloopen (2003) document strong evidence supporting the pecking hierarchy.  
A recent strand of the  literature  is interested in an empirical model that 
embeds both the pecking order and the trade-off theories. In an important paper, 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) propose a simple test for a strict interpretation of 
the pecking order hypothesis, which models net debt issues using the cash flow 
deficit variable. The specification also allows them to nest the trade-off theory in a 
single  framework.  Their  finding  conforms  to  the  pecking  order  theory  and 
simultaneously leads to the rejection of the trade-off framework. Frank and Goyal 
(2003)  extend  the  Shyam-Sunder and Myers approach by examining a broader 
sample of US firms for a longer time-period. They however fail to find evidence in 
favour  of  the  pecking  order  theory.  Most  recent  papers  provide  further  mixed 
evidence to the debate on the applicability of the pecking order’s hierarchy. Among 
others, Chen and Zhao (2004), and Lemmon and Zender (2004) find new evidence 
supporting the modified version of the pecking order theory (e.g. in consideration 
of the role of debt capacity). Nonetheless, Leary and Robert (2004a) report that the 
pecking order’s predictions fail to explain the data well. More importantly, Fama 
and French (2005) show that the evidence on equity issuance strongly violates the 
pecking  order  theory.  In  general,  the  conclusion  from  past  research  remains 
inconclusive. Such mixed results show the importance of further empirical research 
in this area. 4 
With the current empirical literature dominated by US-based research, there 
have been a few UK studies investigating the trade-off and the pecking order 
theories.  Most  of  the UK research examines the explanatory power of various 
determining factors of the debt-equity ratio on a conventional cross-sectional basis 
(Bennett  and  Donnelly,  1993;  Lasfer,  1995;  Michaelas  et  al,  1996; Walsh and 
Ryan, 1997; Jordan et al., 1998; Hall et al., 2000; Short et al., 2002; Bevan and 
Danbolt, 2002; Bevan and Danbolt, 2004). Recent studies by Ozkan (2001) and 
Antoniou et al. (2002) develop a test for the trade-off theory, while Adedeji (2001) 
and Watson and Wilson (2002) investigate the pecking order theory. Nonetheless, 
there  have  been  no  UK  attempts  to  examine  the  power  of  the  two  theories 
simultaneously. 
3  
The main aim of this paper is to test the two leading but competing theories 
of capital structure against a sample of UK firms. To this end, we develop some 
econometric models that nest the two theories in a single framework, along the lines 
of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), and Frank and Goyal (2003). We also employ 
recent econometric techniques to examine an unbalanced panel data set of about 
5,500  year-observations  and  860  UK  firms,  over  the  period  1996-2003.  Our 
analysis makes three contributions to the current empirical literature.  
First, in testing the mean-reversion of the debt ratio, the study adopts an 
error correction model, as a generalised version of the partial adjustment model that 
has been widely exploited in prior research. An error correction equation explicitly 
models the past deviation of the actual debt-equity ratio from the target one, as well 
as the change in the target ratio over time. The use of this model is important 
because it allows us to test the robustness of the results, particularly for the trade-
off theory, to an alternative but a more general specification.  
In terms of methodologies, we employ appropriate testing procedures based 
on recent advances in the econometrics of dynamic panel data to improve the 
robustness  of  the  estimation  results.  The  Anderson  and  Hsiao  (1981,  1982) 
                                                
 
3 In a recent working paper, Benito (2003) examines the trade-off theory using the UK and Spain 
panel data. His empirical model does not use the deficit cash flow variable, so it does not capture the 
pecking order hypothesis. His UK data set is also limited to a sample of quoted firms in the London 
Stock Exchange. 5 
instrumental variable estimator and the Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998) Generalised Methods of Moments (hereafter GMM) estimators are 
adopted to provide a basis for our dynamic panel data analysis.  
The paper can be considered as one of the first UK attempts to formally 
investigate the trade-off theory, against the pecking order theory. The results will 
shed  light  on  the  dominant  financing  behaviour  of  UK  firms,  which  can  be 
compared to non-UK studies. In this respect, unlike the mixed results reported in 
US research (e.g. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), and Frank and Goyal (2003)), 
our study provides consistent evidence to suggest that the trade-off theory holds 
well and consistently outperforms the pecking order theory. Furthermore, it also 
finds significant relationships between debt ratio and some important determinants 
including collateral value of assets, non-debt tax shields and growth, as predicted by 
the trade-off theory. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The first section briefly 
surveys the trade-off and pecking order theories. Next, the paper develops the 
empirical models and econometric methodologies. We then summarise the data and 
sample. The next section presents and interprets the estimation results. Finally, we 
offer some concluding remarks. 
II.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
1.  Trade-off Theory 
The (static) trade-off theory states that each firm has a well-defined optimal 
capital  structure,  which  balances  the  benefits  and  costs  associated  with  debt 
financing. The main benefits of debt include (i) tax deductibility gained by tax-
paying firms (Modigliani and Miller, 1963), and (ii) advantages of using debt to 
mitigate the agency costs of equity and the free cash flow problem (e.g. Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986). The costs of debt can be identified as (i) non-debt 
tax shields (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980), and (ii) agency costs of debt due to 
suboptimal investment behaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), or underinvestment 
problem (Myers, 1977).     6 
1.1. Models Based on Taxes 
In their corrected version of the classic MM’s propositions, Modigliani and 
Miller (1963) show that when corporate tax is taken into consideration, the firm 
value becomes an increasing function of debt. Debt financing is viewed as more 
advantageous than equity because using more debt reduces the expected tax liability 
and  increases  the  after  tax  cash  flow.  This  result  also  implies  that,  given  the 
existence  of  bankruptcy  costs  or  reorganisation  costs  due  to  debt  usage,  there 
should be an optimal capital structure that equates debt tax shields and the cost of 
financial distress. 
The  analysis  in  Modigliani  and  Miller  (1963)  considers  the  impact  of 
corporate  tax  while  ignoring  the  effect  of  personal  income  tax.  Miller  (1977) 
explicitly takes into account the effect of the latter tax code and demonstrates that 
in equilibrium, the total amount of tax saving will be equal to zero. In other words, 
the advantage of the corporate tax is cancelled by the disadvantage of the personal 
tax. The author further suggests that there should be no optimal debt ratio for any 
individual firms. 
DeAngelo  and  Masulis  (1980)  generalise  the  models  developed  in 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) and Miller (1977) by considering the impact of non-
debt tax shields. Their overall finding suggests that when corporate tax shield 
substitutes for debt such as depreciation or investment tax credits are accounted, 
there is some interaction between the firm’ advantages of debt tax shields and non-
debt  tax  shields.  That  results  in  a  unique  optimal  debt  ratio  in  equilibrium, 
regardless  of  the  presence  of  bankruptcy  and  agency  costs.
4  In  rejecting  the 
irrelevance  theorems  of  Modigliani  and  Miller  (1958)  and  Miller  (1977),  the 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) model offers a plausible taxes-based argument for 
the trade-off framework.    
                                                
 
4 DeAngelo and Masulis also maintain that even without the non-debt tax shields, the size of default 
costs would be enough to yield a unique optimal debt-equity choice. 7 
1.2. Models Based on Agency Costs 
The developments in the modern theory of capital structure in the last thirty 
years or so have been devoted to the consideration of principal-agent problems (e.g. 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986; Slutz, 1990; Harris and Raviv, 1990). 
These models have provided insights into the potential benefits and costs associated 
with debt financing.  
In  the  juncture  between  shareholders  and  managers,  the  fact  that  the 
fractional-owner manager only bears a fraction, but not full costs of perquisites, 
gives rise to a typical principal-agent problem. In particular, the former party has an 
incentive to increase the non-pecuniary costs, thereby reducing the firm value and 
generating the agency costs of outside equity (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). One 
possible measure to mitigate these agency costs requires the firm to increase the 
proportion financed by debt, which reduces the cash flow available that otherwise 
would be spent at the discretion of the manager (Jensen, 1986). 
5 
With  respect  to  the  relationship  between  debt-holders  and  equity-
holders/managers, it is argued that debt can generate a different type of incentive 
problems. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that an asset substitution effect is 
possible as the owner/manager has an incentive to invest in risky projects when 
they have negative expected returns. This overinvestment problem arises because 
even when the value-decreasing investment fails, due to limited liability, it is the 
debt-holder, not the owner/manager, who bears the consequences. From another 
perspective, Myers (1977) contends that firms issuing risky debt to outsiders may 
reduce equity-financed capital investment. As debt becomes more risky, the better-
protected  debt-holders  will  be  able  to  capture  more  gain  from  additional 
investment. Consequently, the owner/manager will have no incentive to commit 
new capital, even to invest in value-increasing projects. That results in another 
agency problem, known as the underinvestment or debt overhang problem.
6  
                                                
 
5 In addition to the free cash flow theory by Jensen (1986), Slutz (1990) and Harris and Raviv (1990) 
consider different aspects of the benefits of debt in reducing agency costs. 
6 In fact, as argued in Myers (2001, p. 97), this gain in the market value of debt can be considered as 
a tax on new investment and as that tax is high enough, the manager may even forgo positive NPV 
projects:  “the  greater  the  risk  of  default,  the  greater  benefit  to  existing  debt  from  additional 
investment”. 8 
2.  Pecking Order Theory 
An implicit assumption underpinning the MM theory concerns the way in 
which information is possessed and distributed within the firm and the market. In 
this  respect,  the  introduction  of  asymmetric  information  from  economics  into 
finance has given rise to recent advances in the theory of capital structure.  
In their seminal paper, Myers and Majluf (1984) develop a model in which 
the  capital  structure  choice  is  designed  to  limit  inefficiencies  caused  by 
informational asymmetries.
7 The asymmetric information assumption states that the 
manager knows more about the value of the existing assets and the new growth 
opportunities than the outside investor does. A potential adverse selection problem 
arises as firms with lower value opportunities have an incentive to issue securities 
that  imitate  firms  with  higher  value  opportunities.  This  behaviour  results  in  a 
situation where securities of the former firms can be overvalued while those of the 
latter firms undervalued. To avoid loss of wealth, only share-holders/managers with 
overvalued assets in place will issue outside financing instruments.
8 Consequently, 
investors will predict a decision not to issue securities to signal good news and vice 
versa. This problem leads to a pooling market equilibrium in which new shares can 
only be offered at a marked-down price.  
This adverse selection problem can be mitigated if capital structure follows 
a particular hierarchy (Myers, 1984). The financing choice should be in favour of 
the financing instruments that are less risk and less sensitive to mis-pricing and 
valuation errors. First, internally generated funds with no risks are preferred to 
external financing. Between the two external financing sources, debt with its prior 
claim and lower risks than equity is preferred. The argument leads to the well-
                                                
 
7 Another strand of the literature includes signalling models (e.g. Ross, 1977; Leland and Pyle, 1977; 
Heinkel, 1982), which consider the use of capital structure as a signal of private insider information 
under the asymmetric information framework (i.e. managers possess private information about the 
characteristics of the firm that investors do not). 
8  The argument is put forward under the assumption that managers act in the interest of existing 
shareholders. This can be however a shortcoming of the approach (Watson and Wilson, 2002). As 
demonstrated in the models based on agency costs, the managers may have the discretion to exploit 
their informational advantage to the expense of the shareholders. 9 
known pecking  order  theory,  which  holds  that  internal  finance  is  preferred  to 
external finance, in which debt is preferred to equity (Myers, 1984).
9 
The pecking order theory is in contrast with the trade-off theory since it 
does not envisage that the firm has a well-defined optimal capital structure. The 
theory suggests that the mix of debt and equity should be the cumulative result of 
hierarchical  financing  decisions  overtime  (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). To 
avoid  mis-pricing  of  new  securities,  the  firm  always  uses  up  all  the  retained 
earnings to fund new investments. When this internal financing is insufficient, debt 
will be preferred to outside equity. The latter financing instrument will be issued as 
the last resort, when the firm exceeds its debt capacity. 
III.  EMPIRICAL MODELS AND METHODOLOGIES 
1.  Empirical Specifications for Trade-off Theory 
The trade-off framework implies each firm attempts to achieve the optimal 
capital structure through strategic financing decisions. In reality, however, random 
events or costs can prevent the firm from maintaining the actual debt ratio at, or 
even close to, its target one. If the theory holds, the debt ratio will reverse to its 
target in the long-term. Testing the trade-off theory is therefore a test of mean-
reversion of the debt ratio. 
1.1. Partial Adjustment Model 
The  conventional  econometric  model  to  test  the  mean  reverting 
interpretation of the trade-off theory takes the form of a partial adjustment process 
(e.g. Jalilvand and Harris, 1984; Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; Ozkan, 2001 and 
Fama and French, 2002): 
it it it it it v D D D D + - = - - - ) ( 1
*
1 d  (III-1) 
or:  
                                                
 
9 Titman and Wessels (1988) argue that transaction costs of new equity issue can also be an 
additional reason to explaining why firms follow the pecking order preference. 10 
it it it it v D D D + - + = -1
* ) 1 ( d d  (III-2) 
where  it D  and 
*
it D  denote the actual and target debt ratio for firm i at time t, 
respectively,  ) , 0 ( ~
2
v it IDD v s . In both equations (III-1) and (III-2), d  is the speed 
of adjustment, which shows how fast the firm reverses to its target debt ratio. If a 
firm could adjust to its optimal capital structure fully, the coefficient would be 
equal to 1. Due to adjustment costs, d
 
is expected to be between 0 and 1, with 
higher d  implying higher speed of adjustment. 
Estimating equations (III-1) and (III-2) requires the knowledge of the actual 
observable debt ratio and the target one, which is unobservable. A number of 
solutions are available. First, the target debt ratio can be calculated using (i) the 
historical mean of the debt ratio, or (ii) the (three-year) moving average, (Marsh, 
1982; Jalilvand and Harris, 1984). A limitation of this approach is the dependence 
upon historical data. Theoretically, it is difficult to justify why the target debt ratio 
should remain constant over a period of time (Jalilvand and Harris, 1984; Shyam-
Sunder and Myers, 1999).   
Second, the target debt-equity ratio can be viewed as a unique ratio, which 
is  determined  by  the  firm  individual  characteristics.  Two  issues  arise from this 
approach. The first is the selection of the explanatory variables of the target debt 
ratio. Given the fact that quite a few determining factors have been suggested in the 
literature, an exhaustive list will not be attempted here.
10  In  order  to facilitate 
comparisons  with  previous  conventional  cross-sectional  studies,  five  important 
determinants including collateral value of assets, non-debt tax shields, profitability, 
growth opportunities and firm size are chosen (see Appendix 1 and 2 for further 
discussions on these determinants).  
The second issue concerns the appropriate econometric specification for 
dynamic panel data analysis. Following recent studies (Ozkan, 2001; Miguel and 
Pindado,  2001),  we  adopt  a  two-way-error-component  regression  model.  The 
unobservable  firm  effects  capture  the  firm  and  industry  characteristics  (e.g. 
                                                
 
10 For a comprehensive list of the potential determinants of debt ratios, see Harris and Raviv (1991), 
and Frank and Goyal (2003).  11 
managerial ability and skills; level of competition in the industry, life cycle of 
products and so on).
11 The time effects capture macroeconomic variables, including 
changes in the state of the economy, interest rates and prices, accounting standard 
and other regulations, etc. Both the time and firm effects are treated as fixed effects. 
According to Baltagi (1995), this specification is required when the purpose of the 
test is to examine a specific set of firms and make inference within this set. 
The econometric specification of the target debt ratio is:  
it t i kit k
n
k






where kit x denotes the kth determining factor and  k b the coefficient;. i m  represents 
time-invariant  unobservable  firm  and/or  industry-specific  fixed  effects;  t l
 
represents  firm-invariant  time-specific  fixed  effects,  and  it v  is  the  error  term 
) , 0 ( ~
2
v it IDD v s . 
Estimation of (III-2) given (III-3) can be conducted in two ways. First, one 
can adopt a two-stage procedure,  along  the  lines  of  Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999)  and  Fama  and  French  (2002).  The  first stage  involves estimating  (III-3) 
using the actual ratio, and subsequently deriving the fitted values for the target debt 
ratio. In the second stage, the fitted values obtained from the first regression are 
used as a proxy for the target debt ratio in estimation of equations (III-1) and 
(III-2), respectively. While this procedure is easy to implement, it has limitations. 
In practice, the regression model in (III-3) tends to have a low “goodness of fit” and 
any estimation errors can be carried into the second stage when equations (III-1) or 
(III-2) are estimated. 
The  alternative  option  is  a  one-step  procedure  (e.g.  Ozkan,  2001; 
Wanzenried, 2001), in which equation (III-3) is substituted into (III-2) to yield a 
single equation: 
                                                
 
11  Bennett  and  Donnelly  (1993)  and  Hall  et  al.  (2000)  all  document  the  impact  of  industry 
characteristics on the UK firm capital structure. 12 
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where  d j - =1 0 ,  k k db j = ,  i i dm h = ,  t t dl t =
 
and  it it v d e = .  Note  that  in 
estimation of equation (III-4), both the time and firm effects, and the error term 
retain their properties.  
Using the OLS estimator to estimate (III-4) is likely to result in biased and 
inconsistent coefficients because both  it D  and  1 - it D  are correlated with  i h . The 
econometric literature offers a number of estimation procedures that can overcome 
this  limitation.  First,  according  to  the  Anderson  and  Hsiao  (1981  and  1982) 
procedure  (hereafter  AH),  equation  (III-4)  can  be  transformed  using  first 
differences as follows:  
å
=
- D + D + D + D = D
n
k
it t kit k t i it x D D
1
1 , 0 e t j j  (III-5) 
The individual effects have been eliminated in (III-5), hence no correlation between 
1 - it D  and  i h . Nonetheless, it is likely that the two terms  1 - D it D  and  it e D  will be 
correlated via the correlation between 1 - it D  and  1 - it e . Anderson and Hsiao (1981 
and 1982) propose to use an instrumental variable (IV) estimation method, in which 
either  2 - D it D  or  2 - it D  can be adopted as an instrument for  1 - D it D . This IV estimator 
is consistent since the instruments are correlated with  1 - D it D  (via  2 - it D ) but they 
have no correlation with  it e D .  
The AH IV estimator is potentially inefficient because it does not take into 
account all the moment conditions available in equations (III-4) and (III-5). Recent 
developments in literature have focused on the Generalised Method of Moments 
(hereafter GMM) and their application in dynamic panel data analysis. Arellano and 
Bond (1991) (hereafter AB) suggest the use of a GMM estimator that exploits all 
the linear restrictions under the assumption of no serial correlation. They argue that 
additional instruments can be created using the orthogonality conditions between 
lagged values of the dependent variable and the error term. Considering equation 
(III-5),  for  example,  the  GMM  instruments  for  1 - it D  include  a  set  of  t-2 13 
elements ) ,..., , ( 1 3 2 i it it D D D - - , rather than a single instrument  2 - it D ( 2 - D it D ) as in the 
AH procedure (see also Appendix 3).  
Blundell and Bond (1998) (hereafter BB) maintain that for short sample 
periods and persistent series, the standard GMM estimator can be inefficient. They 
extend the AB procedure by considering additional moment conditions that have 
not yet been utilised. Under the condition of no correlation between  1 - D it D  and  i h , 
the former term can become a valid instrument in the levels equation. This GMM 
system estimation involves estimating both the differenced and levels equations.  
1.2. Error Correction Model 
Although the partial adjustment model has been widely used in the finance 
literature  to  test  the  trade-off  framework,  it  is  criticised  in  the  econometrics 
literature as being ad hoc or as depending on overly restricted assumptions (see 
Maddala, 2001,  p. 408). Attempts to extend the partial adjustment model may 
involve  (i)  specifying  the  speed  of  adjustment  (d )  as  a  function  of  other 
explanatory variables or (ii) generalising it to an Error Correction Model (hereafter 
ECM).
12 In this study, we focus on the latter approach. 
Formally, an ECM for the debt ratio is: 








1 ) ( ) 1 ( - - - + + - = it it it it D D D D d g d g  (III-7) 
where 0< g d, <1. The first term on the right hand side of (III-6) is the change in the 
target debt ratio, and the second term the past deviation of the actual debt ratio from 
the target one. Unlike a partial adjustment model, an ECM explicitly models the 
target change of the dependent variable. In fact, the ECM in (III-6) is a generalised 
version  of  the  partial  adjustment  specification  in  (III-1).  The  former  model  is 
reduced to the latter when  g d = . 
                                                
 
12 Davidson et al. (1978) were among the first to use an ECM specification. Since then it has become 
a widely used model in dynamic econometrics (see Hendry, 1995 for a discussion of ECM). 14 
As with the partial adjustment model, we can proceed in one or two steps. 
The two-stage procedure involves estimating equations (III-3)  and obtaining the 
fitted values of the target debt ratio, which will be used in estimation of equation 
(III-6). In the one-stage procedure, we only estimate a single equation, which is 
derived by substituting (III-3) into (III-7): 
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where  g j - =1 0 ,  k k db j = ,  k k b d g f ) ( - = ,  i i gm h = ,  1 ) ( - - + = t t t dl l g d t  and 
1 ) ( - - + = it it it v v d g d e . 
It  can  be  seen  from  equation  (III-8) that there is a potential correlation 
between  1 - it D  and the disturbance (via the term  1 - it v ), as well as between  1 - it D  and 
the fixed effects  i h . The OLS estimator is thus not an appropriate one. To address 
this issue, one can take the first differences of (III-8) and adopt the Anderson and 
Hsiao  IV,  Arellano  and  Bond  GMM  or  Blundell  and  Bond  GMM  system 
estimators.   
2.  Empirical Specifications for Pecking Order Theory 
A recent strand of the empirical literature attempts to design a test for the 
pecking order theory (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; Frank and Goyal, 2003; 
Watson and Wilson, 2002; Lemmon and Zender, 2003). Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999) develop a simple model for a strict version of the pecking order hypothesis, 
which holds that when the firm needs external finance, it will only issue debt, not 
equity.  After  an  IPO,  equity  financing  is  used  under  extreme  circumstances, 
especially when the cost of financial distress is high. The empirical specification for 
the test takes the following form: 
it it PO it DEF D e b a + + = D
 
(III-9) 
where  it D D  denotes net debt issued,  it DEF  cash flow deficit in year t (all variables 
in levels) and  it e  the well-behaved error term. In equation (III-9), the strict version 
of the pecking order theory holds if  0 = a
 
and 1 = PO b , i.e., when the deficit in cash 
flow is entirely offset by the change in debt.  15 
In order to estimate equation (III-9), we must adopt appropriate proxies for 
the dependent and independent variables. First,  it DEF  is defined as follows: 
) ( E D C DIV I CF DEF D + D = D + + + - =
 
(III-10) 
where CF  denotes Cash flow after tax and interest (i.e. CF = Cash flow from 
Operating activities (Datastream item 1015) - Investment return and servicing of 
finance (1117) – Taxation (433)). I: Net investment (i.e. I = Capital Expenditures 
(1122) + Acquisitions and Disposals (1128)). DIV: Equity dividends paid (1129). 
C D : Net change in cash (1134).  E D : Net equity issued (429).
13 
As  in  Shyam-Sunders  and  Myers  (1999)  and  Frank  and  Goyal  (2003), 
proxies for  it D D  include: (i) total debt ratio in first differences, (ii) net debt issued 
and (iii) gross debt issued scaled by the firm value. Finally, note that equation 
(III-9) is in levels but the conventional procedure requires scaling the variables by a 
common factor such as the market value of the firm.
14  
3.  Models Nesting Trade-off and Pecking Order Theories 
In order to compare the performance of the trade-off against pecking order 
theories, a unified framework that embeds both theories is required. Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers (1999), and Frank and Goyal (2003) both propose to include the cash 
flow deficit in the partial adjustment model (III-1) to nest the pecking order theory,  
it it PO it it it it v DEF D D D D + + - + = - - - b d a ) ( 1
*
1  (III-11)  
The pecking order hypothesis holds if  0 = a
 
and 1 = PO b . Moreover, if  0 = d  (i.e. 
the speed of adjustment not statistically different from zero) then one can reject the 
trade-off theory in favour of the pecking order theory. Again, estimating (III-11) 
can proceed in either one or two steps. The two-step procedure is similar to the one 
adopted in estimating the partial adjustment and error correction specifications. The 
                                                
 
13 For some UK firms, DEF also includes Management of liquid resources (Datastream item 1133). 
14 It can be seen that while scaling is useful as it allows for comparisons, one should take caution in 
interpretation since the coefficients may be strongly affected if the scale is correlated with the 
variables in the equation. 16 
one-step  method  involves  adding  the  variable  it DEF  in  the  partial  adjustment 
specification (equation (III-5)), yielding an important equation as follows: 
it it PO t
n
k




1 , 0  (III-12) 
A similar modification can be also done for an ECM (as specified in (III-8)) 
to nest the pecking order hypothesis.  
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1 0  (III-13) 
Given equation (III-12) and (III-13), one can proceed by adopting the Anderson and 
Hsiao (IV), the Arellano and Bond GMM method or the Blundell and Bond GMM 
system estimators, as detailed in the preceding subsection.  
IV.  DATA 
The data set is a large sample of UK firms collected from Datastream, a 
database that maintains both times series and cross-sectional company data. The 
initial  sample  is the UK research list constructed by the database itself, which 
includes approximately 1,680 firms. The accounting data for all the firms was 
collected from the earliest possible year (which depends upon the individual firms) 
up to January 2004, creating an unbalanced panel data set of nearly 20,000 year-
observations.  
Following previous UK research by Lasfer (1995), Walsh and Ryan (1997), 
Ozkan  (2001),  Short  et  al.  (2002),  a  number  of  conventional  restrictions  are 
imposed on the initial data set. First, firms operating in the financial sector (banks, 
insurance and life assurance companies and investment trusts) and in utilities sector 
(electricity, water and gas distribution) are excluded because they are subject to 
different regulatory accounting and taxation considerations.
15  Second, in order to 
adopt the IV and GMM estimators, only the companies that have five-year or more 
                                                
 
15 About 3,000 year-observations were removed after this restriction was imposed. 17 
observations are retained in the data set.
16 Last, any observations that have missing 
data for the variables of interest are removed.
17 That results in a final sample of 859 
companies and 5,393 year-observations, with the longest time series of 8 years over 
the period 1996-2003. The structure of the sample is summarised in appendix 4 and 
descriptive  statistics  presented  in  appendix  5.  In  appendix  2,  we  discuss  the 
definition and measurements of all the variables used in the paper.  
V.  RESULTS 
In this section, we present and interpret the estimation results. 
18 Apart from 
the coefficients and the asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity, the 
R-squared and RSS, we report five important statistics. These include (i) Wald test 
1, which is a test for joint significance of the estimated coefficients under the null 
of no relationship; (ii) Wald test 2 for the join significance of the time dummies; 
(iii) AR(1) and (iv) AR(2), which are tests for first-order and second-order serial 
correlation, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1)  under  the  null  of  no  first-order 
serial  correlation,  and  (v)  Sargan  test,  which  is  a  test  for  over-identifying 
restrictions, asymptotically distributed as 
2 c , under the null of the validity of the 
instruments (see Doornik et al., 2002).  
1.  Trade-off Theory 
1.1. Partial Adjustment Model  
Table  1  presents  the  results  for  the  estimation  of  the  trade-off  theory, 
modelled by a partial adjustment process in equation (III-5). In columns (1) and (2), 
the  AH  procedure  is  employed,  with  the  instruments  being  2 - D t D  and  2 - t D , 
                                                
 
16 Of about 16,700 observations left after the first restriction, a further 1,000 observations were 
excluded when the minimum five-year time series criteria was used.  The remaining sample includes 
about 15,850 year-observations.  
17 A large number of observations were lost because of the use of the cash flow deficit variable, 
which is computed using some items in the cash flow statement. Our final sample would be more 
than 12,800 year-observations if this single variable were not taken into consideration. 
18 The analysis was conducted using DPD statistical package (integrated in GiveWin 2.10) written in 
Ox code (see Doornik et al., 2002). 18 
respectively.
19 Of the two AH estimations, the one using  2 - t D  as the instrument is 
more appropriate. In column (2), the AR(2) test result is satisfied, while in column 
(1) one can reject the null of no second-order autocorrelation of the (differenced) 
residual at 10%.  In addition, there appears to be an upward bias on the coefficient 
estimates and standard errors in column (1), as compared to the results in column 
(2). This finding is consistent with the previous remark by Arellano (1989) that the 
IV estimator that uses the differences for instruments has larger variances.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
The last two columns of Table 1 present the results for GMM estimation of 
the partial adjustment model. In column (3), it can be seen that the results for the 
AB GMM estimation are appropriate. Both the AR(2) and Sargan tests suggest that 
the absence of second-order autocorrelation and lack of over-identifying restrictions 
cannot  be  rejected.  This  finding  is  in  line  with  previous  studies  using  GMM 
methods by Ozkan (2001), and Miguel and Pindado (2001), who all document that 
the estimation method provides satisfactory results. Unlike Ozkan (2001), however, 
our observation does not to show that the GMM estimation results in column (3) 
can improve considerably from the Anderson-Hsiao estimation in column (2). The 
estimated coefficients are broadly similar, in terms of the sign, level of significance 
and magnitude. 
We also perform Blundell and Bond (1998) GMM system estimation, which 
is postulated to be appropriate for short sample periods and persistent series. The 
results are presented in column (4). First, the AR(2) and Sargan tests show that the 
instruments are valid. However, in terms of magnitude, the results for coefficients 
and  standard  errors  obtained  by  using  the  GMM  system  estimator  differ 
considerably  from  the  results  obtained  by  using  the  GMM  estimator.  Most 
noticeably, the coefficient on the lagged debt ratio ( 1 - D t D ) is found to be .791, 
substantially higher than any other estimated values reported in the table. This 
finding  should  be  treated  with  caution,  as  further  experiments  reveal  that  the 
                                                
 
19  Our  experiment  (not  reported  here)  shows  that,  expectedly,  the  OLS  estimation  using  first 
differences transformation is inappropriate, resulting in clearly biased coefficients on the lagged debt 
ratio. 19 
coefficient on lagged variables obtained by using the GMM system estimator is 
consistently large. 
To  summarise,  our  finding  suggests  that  the  Arellano  and  Bond  GMM 
(column  (3))  estimator  be  an  appropriate  basis  for  estimation  of  the  partial 
adjustment process (see Appendix 6). The Anderson and Hsiao estimation using 
2 - t D  as the instrumental variable (column (2)) also provide satisfactory results. 
More  importantly,  the  finding  shows  that  the  adjustment  process  takes  place 
quickly with the speed significant and above .50. 
1.2. Error Correction Model 
In this section, we interpret the estimation results for the ECM specified in 
equation (III-8). Columns (1), (2), (3) of Table 2 report the results for the two AH 
IV and the AB GMM estimations (all in first differences), respectively. Like in 
Table 1, the first AH estimator has relatively larger standard errors than the second 
does. The second AH estimation results are generally similar to those obtained by 
using the AB GMM estimator (see columns (2) and (3)). According to the AR(2) 
and Sargan test results, both the AH IV and AB GMM estimators satisfy the 
assumptions of valid instruments.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
In  the  last  column,  the  GMM  system  estimation  is  performed.  The 
instruments for the differenced equations are restricted to  ) ,..., , ( 5 3 2 - - - it it it D D D , in 
order  to  avoid  over-identifying  restrictions  (in  Table  1,  the  instruments  are 
) ,..., , ( 1 3 2 i it it D D D - - ). It can be seen that in column (4), the Sargan test suggests 
instrument validity. In other respect, comparing the results in columns (3) and (4), 
one  can  notice  that  the  coefficients  on  the  explanatory  variables  only  differ 
marginally and so do the standard errors. The sign and level of significance of these 
coefficients are broadly similar in two the models. Nonetheless, the coefficients on 
1 - D t D  are considerably different (.391 and .768). This result indicates that the 
GMM system estimation results need treating with care. 20 
In short, it has been shown that the two regressions using the Anderson and 
Hsiao  instrumental  variable  or  Arellano  and  Bond  GMM  estimator  are  the 
appropriate ones. With respect to the speed of adjustment, it can be seen from 
equation (III-7),  that  the  one-stage procedure only allows us to make inference 
about g  (which could be interpreted to be the speed of adjustment of the past 
disequilibrium to the target debt ratio). In both columns (2) and (3), g is found to be 
statistically significant and greater than .50 (as  g - 1  is estimated to be .460 and 
.391, respectively).  
1.3. Two-stage Estimation of Partial Adjustment and Error Correction Model 
The  one-stage  procedure  adopted  in  the  previous  subsections  does  not 
estimate the speed of adjustment directly. In what follows, our analysis considers 
the two-stage procedure.
20 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 3 report the pooled OLS estimation results for 
the partial adjustment and ECM, respectively. Consistent with the results obtained 
by implementing the one-stage procedure, our overall examination shows that the 
two model specifications are satisfactory with relatively high
2 R  (.350 and .352, 
respectively).  More  importantly,  the  speeds  of  adjustment  are  found  to  be 
significant, lending further support for the trade-off theory. In column (1), d
 
is 
found to be strongly significant and equal to .671.
21 In column (2), both the change 
in the target debt ratio ( t D
* D ), and the deviation of the past actual ratio from the 
past target one  ) ( 1 1
*
- - - t t D D  have significant effects upon the adjustment to the 
actual target ratio. In terms of the magnitude, d
 
and g  are found to be .842 and 
.649, respectively. This finding provides further evidence to suggest that the trade-
off theory holds well. Furthermore, the ECM as a general version of the standard 
                                                 
 
20  As discussed, the two-stage procedure involves estimating equation (III-3) using Within-group 
transformation, then obtaining the fitted values for the debt ratio and using them as the target debt 
ratio to estimate equations (III-1) and (III-2) under the partial adjustment framework, or equations 
(III-6) and (III-7) under the error correction framework 
21 This finding is slightly higher than the result obtained by using one-stage testing procedure (where 
d  is between .50 and .60). 21 
partial adjustment process is an appropriate specification, which explains well the 
mean-reverting behaviour of the debt ratio.         
2.  Pecking Order Theory 
In this section, we perform a test for the pecking order hypothesis, which 
has been confined to a single regression in equation (III-9). The last three columns 
of Table 3 present the regression results, which are obtained by using pooled OLS. 
We adopt three proxies for the dependent variable, including (i) the first differenced 
debt ratio, (ii) net debt issued and (iii) gross debt issued ratio, all measured in 
market values.  
A general examination of the results shows that in all there models, the 
estimated coefficient on the cash flow deficit variable ( t DEF ) is significant but 
small in magnitudes. It can be seen that the coefficient on  t DEF  in column (4), 
where the dependent variable is net debt issued ratio, is the relatively high (.322), 
compared to other results in the table.
22 This finding suggests that the firm net debt 
issued be strongly related to the amount of cash flow deficit. It is interesting to note 
that this result is in line with Shyam-Sunders and Myers (1999), and Frank and 
Goyal  (2003),  who  find  that  using  net  debt  issued  as  the  dependent  variable 
generally yields a better good fit. 
All of the estimation results fail to support the simple interpretation of the 
pecking order hypothesis, which would require the coefficient  PO b  to be equal to 
unity  and  the  estimated  constant  equal  to  zero.  Regarding  previous  empirical 
evidence, this finding is not consistent with by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), 
who observe that most of the cash flow deficit is offset by the change in debt (as 
they find  PO b
 
to be close to unity). Our result is in line with Frank and Goyal 
(2003), who generally document the evidence against the pecking order hypothesis 
for a US sample in the 1990s. In short, our finding suggests that the simple model 
of the pecking order hypothesis does not explain the UK data.  
                                                
 
22 These two specifications also have a relatively high 
2 R  in comparison with the rest (0.320 and 
0.197, respectively). 22 
3.  Trade-off and Pecking Order Theories 
The failure of the pecking order theory to explain the data leads to an 
interesting question as how it works in a model that also nests the competing trade-
off theory. In Table 4, the two theories are nested in a single equation, under both 
the PA framework and ECM. Like in the last three columns of Table 3, three 
measures of the dependent variable are used.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
In columns (1) and (4), where the dependent variable is measured by the 
change in market value-based debt ratio, the results have improved considerably, in 
comparison with column (3) of Table 3. In both columns, the “goodness of fit” 
indicator increases to .369 from .064. The adoption of the partial adjustment and 
error  correction  framework  has  made  the  model  more  fit.  On  the  contrary,  in 
comparing the results with those in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3, one can notice 
that the presence of the cash flow deficit variable does not add any significant 
amount  of  explanatory  power.  More  importantly,  the  coefficient  PO b
 
remains 
relatively small. The estimates of the speed of adjustment reported in Table 3 and 
Table 4 are relatively unchanged, with or without the cash flow deficit variable. 
Under  the  partial  adjustment  framework,  d
 
is  found  to  be  .671  and  .640, 
respectively (see column (1) of Table 3 and column (1) of Table 4). Similarly, the 
estimates of two speeds of adjustment of the ECM do not change considerably (see 
column (2) of Table 3 and column (4) of Table 4). In the former table, d and g  are 
found to be .842 and .649, while in the latter, the estimates are .730 and .629, 
respectively. 
In columns (2) and (5) of Table 4, the pecking order theory appears to 
perform relatively well, in comparison with the trade-off theory. The coefficient 
estimates of  t DEF  are higher than any other alternative estimates of this variable. 
Furthermore, due to the additional effect of the cash flow deficit variable, the 
estimates  of  d and g
 
have decreased considerably from the results in Table 3 
(
2 R remain relatively unchanged). This is consistent with our previous result that 
net  debt  issued  and  cash  flow  deficit  exhibit  a  very  strong  relationship. 23 
Nevertheless, the evidence does not suggest that the pecking order theory holds 
because the estimates of  PO b  remain significantly less than unity. This finding 
cannot undermine the power of the trade-off theory, which is meant to explain the 
change in debt ratio rather than net debt issued ratio (see Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 
1999). 
Further examination of the results reported in columns (3) and (6) shows 
that none of the theories performs well. This finding for the trade-off framework is 
not surprising, given the fact that the theory is little concerned with gross debt 
issued.  According  to  Shyam-Sunder  and  Myers  (1999),  one  would  expect  the 
pecking  order  theory  to  explain  gross  debt  issued  better  than  it  does  to  other 
measures such as the change in debt ratio, or even net debt issued. The results in 
Table 4 reveal that  PO b  remains small (.161 and .165, respectively), broadly similar 
to the finding in column (5) Table 3. This provides additional evidence against the 
pecking order hypothesis.  
Finally, we examine the power of the trade-off and pecking order theories 
by using the one-stage testing procedure. The estimation results are presented in 
Table 5. The econometric models are based on the partial adjustment or error 
correction framework that have been modified to include an additional variable 
( t DEF ) to nest the pecking order theory (see equation (III-12) and (III-13). The 
results, which are obtained by adopting the AH IV and AB GMM estimator show 
that  the  estimates  of PO b
 
are  significant  but  small  and  far  from  unity.  The 
coefficient  on  1 - it D  (or  1 - D it D )  in  all  of  the  models  only  changes  slightly  in 
magnitudes. In particular, it can be seen from the estimations in columns (2) and 
(3), and (4) and (5), that the speed of adjustment (d ) is significant and remains 
around .60, which is consistent with the evidence in the preceding subsections. 
With respect to the conventional explanatory variables of debt ratio, their sign and 
level  of  significance  are  unaffected  by  the  inclusion  of  the  cash  flow  deficit 
variable. There are some changes in magnitudes but these are too small and can be 
neglected. In short, the cash flow deficit variable does not have any significant 
additional explanatory effects upon the model. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 24 
In sum, our results suggest that the pecking order theory does not perform as 
well as the trade-off theory. Although the cash flow deficit and some measures of 
debt (particularly net debt issued ratio) have a strong relationship, there has been 
little evidence that the former variable is fully offset by debt, as predicted by the 
strict version of the pecking order hypothesis. On the contrary, it has been shown 
that the  trade-off theory, modelled by the partial adjustment or error correction 
framework, explains the firm financing behaviour well. 
4.  On the Determinants of Capital Structure 
The results of the previous section are relatively supportive of the trade-off 
theory, and unfavourable to the pecking order theory. In this section, we further 
examine the implications of the two theories for the standard explanatory variables 
of the debt ratio. In general, the evidence lends further support to the hypotheses 
developed within the trade-off framework. Our discussion is based on the results for 
the satisfactory specifications in columns (2) and (3) of Tables 1 and 2. 
The  trade-off  framework  contends  that  CVAS  and  debt  ratios  have  a 
significant relationship, although it is not indicative as to whether the relationship 
should be positive or negative. In line with the major body of prior empirical 
results, the study reveals very strong and consistent evidence that CVAS have a 
significant and positive relationship with the total debt ratio. This finding lends 
support to the view that firms with more collateralisable assets issue more debt. 
Under the principal-agent framework, collateral can be used as a security to reduce 
the  agency  costs  of  debt,  as  well  as  to  avoid  the  asset  substitution  problem. 
However, the finding does not support the proposition developed by Titman and 
Wessels (1988) that firms with less collateralised assets should employ more debt 
in order to limit the managers’ discretion over the use of fund. Monitoring may not 
be a serious problem for the firms selected in our sample, which seem to be large 
and may have an effective control system. Empirically, the finding is in line with 
previous UK evidence by Bennett and Donnelly (1993), and Bevan and Danbolt 
(2002),  while  it  is  inconsistent  with  Short  et  al.  (2002),  who  fail  to  find  the 
relationship  to  be  significant.  Our  evidence  is  also  consistent  with  other  US 25 
research  by  Long  and  Malitz  (1985),  Friend  and  Lang  (1988)  and  Rajan  and 
Zingales (1995).  
The trade-off theory predicts that firms with high level of non-debt tax 
shields use less debt since they can substitute for debt tax shields (DeAngelo and 
Masulis, 1980). Despite the potential correlation between the measure of NDTS and 
that of CVAS (via the correlation between depreciation and fixed assets), most of 
the results reveal that the coefficient on NDTS is negative and significant. There is 
also some evidence that past values of NDTS have a negative impact on debt ratio 
(Table  5  columns  (3)  and  (4)).  All  these  results  are  supportive  of  the  trade-off 
framework. This finding is consistent with the results in two UK studies by Bennett 
and Donnelly (1993) and Ozkan (2001) with the latter study using the same proxy 
as ours. However, our evidence is not in line with what found in Michealas et al. 
(1996) and other non-UK studies by Bradley et al. (1984) and Boyle and Eckhold, 
(1997).  
The models based on agency costs argue that firms with high growth have 
more investment  schedules  available,  which  give  rise  to  a potential  suboptimal 
investment  problem.  It  is  hypothesised  that  firms  with  available  growth 
opportunities should have a lower debt ratio in order to prevent managers from 
investing  in  value-decreasing  projects.  The  results  in  our  study  support  the 
proposition that growth opportunities have an inverse effect upon gearing. The 
coefficients on GRTH (measured by market to book ratio) and the lagged variable 
are negative and significant, although they are relatively small in magnitude.
23 
Empirically, the finding is in line with the well-documented evidence in US studies 
by  Rajan  and  Zingales  (1995),  and  Frank  and  Goyal  (2003).  This  is  however 
inconsistent with the results for UK data by Wald (1999), and only partially in line 
with the evidence in Ozkan (2001), who fails to find a negative coefficient on the 
lagged growth. 
                                                
 
23  While  a  negative  relationship between GRTH and gearing can be considered as compelling 
evidence of the agency theory and hence the trade-off framework, this finding could well conform to 
different views. Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that finding may support the contention that firms 
with high market to book value are tempted to issue equity and reduce gearing. Furthermore, the 
finding may also be consistent with the argument that firms with high gearing ratio have higher 
financial distress and discounted rate, and hence lower market value. All these indicate that our 
interpretation of the finding should be taken with care. 26 
It is postulated that under the assumption of information asymmetries, firms 
with high profitability are likely to have more retained earnings, which allow them 
to use internal finance instead of external debt, consistent with the pecking order 
theory  prediction.  This  argument  suggests  that  profitability  and  gearing have a 
negative  relationship.  Alternatively,  one  can  also  expect  a  positive  association 
between debt ratio and profitability given the latter can be considered as a proxy for 
the firm cash free flow. The latter proposition is based on the principal-agent 
argument by Jensen (1986) that firms use debt financing as a disciplinary device to 
prevent managers from consuming the available free cash flow. Our estimation 
results reveal that PRFT (measured by EBIT to total assets) is significantly and 
inversely related gearing ratio.
24 This finding is in line with the empirical evidence 
reported in Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Fama and 
French (2002), Frank and Goyal (2003), as well as in recent UK research by Ozkan 
(2001), Short et al. (2002), Bevan and Danbolt (2002, 2004). Note that the negative 
coefficient on profitability is relatively in favour of the pecking order hypothesis. 
Given  the  fact  that  our  test  for  the  strict  version  of  the  pecking  order  theory 
suggests the opposite, this present finding is difficult to interpret. It is possible that 
for our data, profitability may proxy for an unknown underlying factor other than 
the pecking order or the free cash flow hypothesis.   
The  consensus  of  the  literature  on  capital  structure  suggests  that  the 
relationship between size and gearing ratio should be a positive one. Our results 
show that the coefficients on lagged size are negative and insignificant while those 
on size are strongly significant and positive. Although the first observation remains 
difficult to explain, the second finding is consistent with previous UK evidence in 
favour of the size effect by Bennett and Donnelly (1993) and Short et al. (2002). 
Yet it remains difficult to suggest which theory this finding is in supportive of, 
since both the trade-off and pecking order theories have the same prediction. Larger 
firms may face lower bankruptcy costs (as they are regarded as “too big to fail” – 
Bevan and Danbolt, 2002), agency costs and transactions costs, while may be less 
                                                 
 
24 In other respect, unlike Ozkan (2001), our estimation results in Table 5, columns (3) and (4) also 
show that the coefficients on the lagged profitability variable are significant and negative. Since it 
has been argued that past profitability can proxy future growth, this latter observation further 
confirms the previous results regarding the relationship between growth opportunities and gearing. 27 
vulnerable to informational  asymmetries  and  adverse  selection  problems, which 
allow them to rely more heavily on debt financing, as compared to smaller firms. 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
The  study  has  examined  the  performance  of  two  influential  but 
contradicting theories of capital structure, known as the trade-off and pecking order 
theory. In general, our finding suggests that the trade-off theory holds well under 
both a partial adjustment and an error correction framework. In specifications that 
nest both theories, the former theory outperforms the latter theory. The introduction 
of the cash flow deficit variable has added little amount of additional explanatory 
power to the trade-off framework. Furthermore, the estimated coefficient on that 
variable is not found to be statistically equal to unity as it would be if the strict 
interpretation of the pecking order theory were to hold. The results consistently 
show that the adjustment process prevails with the speed of adjustment coefficient 
significant and relatively high (above .50). There has been also some compelling 
evidence  in  favour  of  the  relationships  between  gearing  and  the  conventional 
determining  factors  (except  profitability),  as  predicted  by  trade-off framework. 
Non-debt tax shields and growth opportunities are reported to be inversely related 
to debt ratio, while collateral value of assets and size are found to have positive 
effects upon gearing.  
In terms of methodologies, our study shows that the use of an ECM as a 
generalised  version  of  the  partial  adjustment  process  has  improved  our 
understanding of the firm financing behaviour. Unlike the partial adjustment model, 
an ECM allows the target debt ratio to vary overtime and the evidence has shown 
that the change in the optimal ratio has a significant impact upon the adjustment 
process. In other respect, our results also conform to Ozkan (2001) and Miguel and 
Pindado (2001) in that the use of appropriate econometric techniques for dynamic 
panel data such as the Anderson and Hsiao IV and the Arellano and Bond GMM 
estimators has improved our estimation results.   
Finally, some issues remain for further research. Apart from using an ECM, 
another way to general the partial adjustment process is to model the speed of 
adjustment as a function of the firm characteristics (see Loof, 2003 for this research 28 
direction). In other respect, our study has posed serious questions on the empirical 
validity of the pecking order theory. However, given the simplicity of the empirical 
model, it is impossible to reject the pecking order theory prediction completely (e.g. 
see critiques in Chirinko and Singha, 2000, Lemmon and Zender, 2004, Leary and 
Roberts, 2004a). A more shaper and less restrictive model would also be a matter of 
future study.  29 
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APPENDICES  
Appendix 1. On the determinants of capital structure 
The following table summaries the prior theoretical prediction and empirical evidence on 
the determinants of capital structure.   
Table A-1.1. Determining factors of capital structure:                                    











1  Collateral value of Assets  +/-  
(+) BD, BDa, SKDx, RZ, TWx 
(-) BDb 
2  Non-debt tax shields  -  
(+) BJK 
(-) BD, O, TWx, W 
3  Growth   -  
(+) SKDx, W 
(-) BDa, BDbx, O, RZ, TWx 
4  Profitability  +  - 
(+) LMx,  
(-) BDa, BDb, O, SKD, RZ, TW, W 
5  Size  +  + 
(+) BD, BDax, BDb, SKD, RZx, W 
(-) Ox, TWx 
Notes: 
1. Symbol + indicates the significant and positive relationship between the factor and debt ratios. On 
the contrary, symbol – indicates the significant and negative relationship. Symbol x indicates the 
result (i.e. the relationship in question) was found not statistically significant. 
2. The empirical results reported are summarised from well-cited US studies by Bradley et al. (1984) 
(denoted BJK); Titman and Wessels (1988) (TW); UK results from cross-country studies by Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) (RZ); Wald (1999) (W); and UK studies by Bennett and Donnelly (1993) (BD); 
Ozkan (2001) (O); Short et al. (2002) (SKD); Bevan and Danbolt (2002) (BDa); Bevan and Danbolt 
(2004) (BDb). (In studies that have many results, only the result with relevant measures is included), 
4. It should be noted that all the studies surveyed in the table might use different measures of debt 
ratios  as  well  as  determining  factors.  They  also  use  different  time-periods  and  different 
methodologies. 
Appendix 2. Measurements of variables 
Measures of dependent variables - Deb ratios: Consistent with previous UK research by 
Bennett and Donnelly (1993) and Short et al. (2002), the main proxy employed in this study is the 
total debt (Datastream item 1301) scaled by the total market value of equity and debt. The market 
value of equity plus debt is preferred to book value one, since the theoretical framework has so far 
considered capital structure in terms of market values (Bennett and Donnelly, 1993). Moreover, 
Short et al. (2002) contend that book values of equity are highly subject to manipulation from the 
use of various creative accounting techniques, which make it difficult to compare among firms on a 
cross-sectional basis. It should be noted also that, in principle, the market value is the sum of the 
market value of equity (i.e. market capitalisation – Datastream item MV) and that of debt. However, 
due to the lack of the market data of debt, the book value of debt (i.e. total debt - Datastream item 
1301) is used instead.  According to Titman and Wessels (1988), this should not be regarded as a 
serious limitation because the market value and book value of debt can be highly correlated. 35 
Measures of determining factors 
Collateral value of Assets (CVAS): This study follows the major body of the past empirical 
literature that applies Fixed Assets (Datastream item 339) scaled by Total Assets (all in book values) 
as the measure of this variable (e.g. Chung, 1993; Boyle and Eckhold, 1997; Short et al., 2002).  
Non-Debt Tax Shields (NDTS): The most widely-used measure for Non-Debt Tax Shields 
(NDTS) in past research is Depreciation (Datastream item 136) divided by Total Assets (e.g. Titman 
and Wessels, 1988; Michaelas et al., 1998; Ozkan, 2001). This measure is employed in our study, 
although caution should be taken due to its potential correlation with the measure of CVAS (see 
Bennett and Donnelly, 1993) as well as with the proxy for Growth (Ozkan, 2001).  
Profitability (PRFT): Prior research generally agrees on the measurement of Profitability 
(PRFT) with the common proxy being Profit to Total assets ratio. Differences are only concerned 
with what specific measure of profit should be used, be it trading profit, EBIT, EBITDA or retained 
earnings. This study uses EBIT to Total assets as the proxy for profitability because of the high 
availability of data for EBIT (Datastream item 1300).  
Growth (GRTH): According to previous studies, there are two popular proxies for Growth, 
including (i) the change in Total assets (e.g. Titman and Wessels, 1988; Short et al., 2002) or (ii) the 
firm market to book value ratio (e.g. Myers, 1977; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Barclay et al., 1995; 
Frank and Goyal, 2003). Since former measure tends to capture the past growth rather than the 
expected growth, our study employs the latter measure.  
SIZE (SIZE): There is a considerable consensus among previous research regarding the 
measurement of size. In general, the factor is proxied by either (i) the natural logarithm of total 
assets (e.g. Michaelas et al., 1998; Hall et al., 2000) or (ii) the natural logarithm of total sales 
(Ozkan, 2001; Short et al., 2002). This study adopts the former measure. 
Appendix 3. Definition of GMM instruments 
The standard GMM instruments for the lagged values of the dependent variable can be 
therefore generalised by the following matrix: 
] ,..., [ 1 N Z Z Z ¢ ¢ =
 
where  i Z is the matrix including all the GMM for individual i ( N n ,..., 1 = ): 
)] ,..., , ( [ 1 3 2 i it it i D D D diag Z - - =
 
where  T t ,..., 3 =
 
(T is length of the time series). 
 The GMM system instruments include the standard GMM instruments defined above, and 
further instruments for the lagged values of the dependent variable in levels equations: 
+
i Z , where 
)] ,..., , ( [ 1 3 2 i it it i D D D diag Z - -
+ = .  36 
Appendix 4. Sample Description  
Table A-4.1 and A-4.2 summaries the data set employed in this study. 
Table A-4.1. Summary of the structure of the unbalanced panel data set 
Year  Number of 
companies 
1996  167 
1997  742 
1998  833 
1999  859 
2000  859 
2001  858 
2002  833 
2003  241 
Total  859 





5  80 
6  463 
7  313 
8  3 
Total  859 
 
It  should  be  noted  that  a number of limitations can arise due to our sample selection 
procedure. First, it can be seen that the initial sample is not selected entirely randomly, but rather it 
is a research sample constructed by Datastream with potential monitoring bias. It is possible that the 
list could be biased to large and public firms whose data may be more available and easy to 
supervise. In addition, this problem can become more pronounced due to our exclusion of the 
observations  that  have  missing  data.  The  requirement  of  some  cash  flow  statement  items,  for 
example, could also exclude many small firms that typically do not make this type of data available. 
All these issues may consequently limit the ability of the study to generalise its results. Nonetheless, 
given the fact that the final sample of 859 companies includes most of the firms in the FTSE All 
share index, that is estimated to represents 98-99% of the UK capitalisation, the results produced by 
this study are still expected to exhibit the behaviour of a large proportion of the UK economy.  37 
Appendix 5. Descriptive analysis 
Table A-5.1. Descriptive analysis for variables  
Variables  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
MTD  Mean  0.1672  0.1545  0.1818  0.1845  0.1951  0.2315  0.2464  0.2387 
 
Std E  0.0122  0.0059  0.0064  0.0062  0.0067  0.0072  0.0078  0.0151 
CVAS  Mean  0.3361  0.3187  0.3230  0.3215  0.3004  0.3023  0.2979  0.2996 
 
Std E  0.0178  0.0087  0.0083  0.0082  0.0082  0.0085  0.0086  0.0169 
NDTS  Mean  0.0381  0.0367  0.0383  0.0414  0.0378  0.0386  0.0413  0.0449 
 
Std E  0.0021  0.0010  0.0010  0.0019  0.0010  0.0011  0.0012  0.0025 
PROF  Mean  0.0748  0.0531  0.0345  0.0370  0.0164  -0.0463  -0.0418  -0.1183 
 
Std E  0.0123  0.0095  0.0138  0.0113  0.0130  0.0156  0.0117  0.0375 
GRTH  Mean  2.0334  2.1979  2.1787  2.5280  2.7064  1.7033  1.4848  1.7585 
 
Std E  0.1081  0.0949  0.0838  0.1432  0.2398  0.0562  0.0465  0.1520 
SIZE  Mean  11.9977  11.0320  11.0288  11.0793  11.3073  11.3813  11.3389  10.6907 
 
Std E  0.1677  0.0778  0.0717  0.0712  0.0703  0.0709  0.0725  0.1282 
Notes: MTD denote total debt to the firm book value and market value. CVAS denotes Collateral 
values of Assets, measured by Fixed assets scaled Total assets. NDTS denotes Non-debt Tax shields, 
measured by Depreciation scaled Total assets. PRFT denotes Profitability, measured by EBIT scaled 
Total assets. GRTH denotes Growth, measured by market value scaled by book value. SIZE denotes 
Size itself, measured by natural logarithm of Total assets. 
Summary statistics for the dependent variable and five determining factors of debt ratios are 
presented in Table A-3. Some interesting results are in order. First, it can be seen that the market 
value based debt ratio experienced a decrease from 1996 to 1997, before rising steadily up to 2001 
with the market value based measures showing the most pronounced increase. After reaching the top 
in 2002, however, the ratio has shown a trend of a decline. In general, this pattern suggests there 
could be some adjustment process, taking place over time. In terms of the explanatory variables, the 
mean of CVAS has been fluctuating around .30 over the period, smaller than the 1991-1997 figure of 
.35 reported in Bevan and Danbolt (2004). Without taking into account the differences of their 
sample and ours, this finding shows there has been probably a shift in the asset structure of UK firms 
since the year 1996. In terms of NDTS, the mean has varied from .036 to .044 over the period, 
consistent with, if not slightly higher than, the reported mean of .036 in Ozkan (2001). The proxy for 
profitability (PRFT) saw its mean decreasing gradually over the period, to -.1183 in 2003 from .0748 
in 1996, suggesting that the UK businesses have suffered a decline in recent years. In other respect, 
there  have  been some  fluctuations  in  the  market  to  book  value  ratio  - our measure for growth 
opportunities  (GRTH),  although  they  have  remained  significantly  higher  than  unity.  The  latter 
observation also indicates that book values may fail to reflect the value of UK firms, hence the need 
to use market value based debt ratio as the main measure of the dependent variable. 38 
Appendix 6. Other specifications 
Table A-6.1 Regression results for the standard static model 
Dependent variable: Debt ratios 
MTD    MTD   MTD 
(1)   (2)   (3) 
Independent 
variables 
Pooled OLS   Differences   Within-group 
t CVAS  0.226***   0.216***   0.210*** 
 
(0.026)   (0.034)   (0.042) 
t NDTS  -0.329***   -0.152*   -0.053  
(0.117)   (0.087)   (0.1627) 
t PRFT  -0.063***   -0.044***   -0.052***  
(0.013)   (0.012)   (0.011) 
t GRTH  -0.010***   -0.002***   -0.003***  
(0.003)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
t SIZE  0.015***   0.054***   0.050***  
(0.002)   (0.007)   (0.006) 
Instruments  None   None   None 
No of obs  5393   4534   5393 
R-squared  0.177   0.076   0.165 
RSS  174.896   63.533   61.22 
Wald test 1   191.0(5)***   85.57(5)***   98.51(5)*** 
Wald test 2   113.2(8)***   151.9(7)***   129.8(7)*** 
AR(1) test  15.49***   -5.098***   10.34*** 
AR(2) test  13.22***   -4.161***   -9.861*** 
Sargan test   -   -   - 
Notes: 
1.  *, ** and ***  indicate the coefficient significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 2. Year 
dummies are included in all specifications except the first one. 
Columns (1), (2) and (3) reveal the regression results of the pooled  OLS (without the 
individual  effects),  first  differences  and  within-group  estimation  (both  including  the  individual 
effects), respectively. Of the two transformation methods used in columns (2) and (3), the within-
group  is  preferred  to  first  differences  since  it  yields  a  higher  “goodness  of  fit”  measure  (i.e. 
.165>.076). Moreover, unlike the first differences estimation, the within-group one can avoid losing 
one-year observation for all the individuals. Hence, it can be argued that the latter estimation method 
may be the most appropriate specification for our cross-sectional standard static model. On this 
basis, the target debt ratio to be adopted in the two-stage procedure in the study are computed using 
the results obtained from this specification (i.e. the target debt ratio will be set equal to the fitted 
values obtained from column (3)).     39 
Table A-6.2 Regression results for other specifications 
Dependent variable: Debt ratios 
MTD   MTD    MTD   MTD 




GMM1/Diff   OLS/Diff   GMM/Diff   GMM/Diff 
1 - t D  0.425***   -0.102***   0.328***   0.253* 
 
(0.072)   (0.023)   (0.111)   (0.150) 
t CVAS  0.244***   0.230***   0.507**   0.794*  
(0.044)   (0.040)   (0.248)   (0.467) 
t NDTS  -0.375***   -0.136   0.058   1.917  
(0.076)   (0.089)   (0.305)   (1.649) 
t PRFT  -0.053***   -0.043***   0.008   -0.073  
(0.016)   (0.012)   (0.022)   (0.096) 
t GRTH  -0.003***   -0.002***   0.001   -0.006  
(0.001)   (0.001)   (0.002)   (0.005) 
t SIZE  0.063***   0.049***   0.101**   0.080  
(0.010)   (0.008)   (0.041)   (0.193) 
Instruments  GMM   None  
GMM, 
1 - D t x  
GMM, 
0 2 - D t x 
No of obs  3675   3675   3675   2816 
R-squared  -   0.086   -   - 
RSS  67.414   52.886   67.737   71.23 
Wald test 1   110.3(6)***   101.8(6)***   70.90(6)***   46.51(6)*** 
Wald test 2   59.31(6)***   121.7(6)***   68.12(6)***   17.87(5)*** 
AR(1) test  -5.855***   -1.414   -3.20***   -2.688*** 
AR(2) test  -1.216   -3.276***   -1.677*   -0.389 
Sargan test   21.74(20)   -   26.86(19)   16.86(19) 
Notes: 1. See description of the measures of variables in Table 1 Notes. 2. Column (2) adopts the 
two-step  Arellano  and  Bond  (1991)  GMM  estimation  method,  using  instruments: 
) ,..., , ( 1 3 2 i it it D D D - - and  t x D . 3. Columns (2) adopt OLS estimation method (in first differences). 
4.  Columns  (3)  and  (4)  assume  the  explanatory  are  pre-determined,  and  thus  adopt 
) ,..., , ( 1 3 2 i it it D D D - - and  1 - D t x ,  and  ) ,..., , ( 1 3 2 i it it D D D - - and  2 - D t x as  the  instruments, 
respectively.  5. Year dummies variables are included and first differences used in all specifications. 
6.  *, ** and ***  indicate the coefficient significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Comparing the two specifications in columns (1) and (2) with the former being selected and 
reported in the study, one can clearly see that the OLS estimation using differences transformation is 
inappropriate. As discussed earlier, the likelihood that  1 - D t D  is correlated with the error term can 
lead to the biasedness of the estimated coefficients. Our results actually show that the coefficient on 
the lagged debt ratio (-.102) is negative and significantly different from the ones estimated using the 
GMM estimation method reported column (1). 
Throughout  the  study,  all  the  explanatory  variables  are  assumed  to  be  exogenous.  In 
columns (3) and (4), as an experiment, they are treated as endogenous, in which case the lagged 
independent variables in first differences  1 - D t x  are used as the instruments for  t x D
 
in column (3) 
and  2 - D t x  for  t x D
 
in column (4) . Unexpectedly, and inconsistent with previous research (e.g. 40 
Ozkan, 2001), our finding in column (3) shows that there is some evidence of not only first-order but 
also second-order autocorrelation, which violate the vitally important assumption of the GMM 
estimator (although note that the Sargan test is indeed satisfactory). In column (4), although this 
AR(2) problem has been eliminated, like in column (3) the coefficient estimates are found to be 
considerably different from those reported in column (1) and (2), in respect of the sign, level of 
significance and magnitude. This finding does not lend support to the assumption of endogeneity. 
On this basis, all the explanatory variables in this study are treated as strictly exogenous.  41 
Table 1. Regression results for Partial Adjustment Model 
Dependent variable: Debt ratios 
MTD   MTD   MTD   MTD 




AH1/Diff   AH2/Diff   GMM/Diff   GMMsys/Diff 
1 - t D  0.676***   0.480***   0.425***   0.791*** 
 
(0.198)   (0.068)   (0.072)   (0.031) 
t CVAS  0.217***   0.238***   0.244***   0.092***  
(0.054)   (0.044)   (0.044)   (0.012) 
t NDTS  -0.519***   -0.409***   -0.375***   -0.459***  
(0.188)   (0.085)   (0.076)   (0.058) 
t PRFT  -0.065***   -0.058***   -0.053***   -0.040***  
(0.023)   (0.017)   (0.016)   (0.013) 
t GRTH  -0.003***   -0.003***   -0.003***   -0.004***  
(0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001) 
t SIZE  0.071***   0.064***   0.063***   0.008***  
(0.013)   (0.009)   (0.010)   (0.001) 
Instruments  2 - D t D   2 - t D   GMM   GMM system 
No of obs  2816   3675   3675   4534 
R-squared  -   -   -   - 
RSS  65.118   70.533   67.414   61.001 
Wald test 1   60.81(6)***   130.7(6)***   110.3(6)***   2049(6)*** 
Wald test 2   32.04(5)***   60.31(6)***   59.31(6)***   46.04(7)*** 
AR(1) test  -4.100***   -7.135***   -5.855***   -12.26*** 
AR(2) test  -1.677*   -1.198   -1.216   -1.122 
Sargan test   -   -   21.74(20)   37.44(26) 
Notes: 1. MTD denote total debt scaled by the market value of equity plus the book value of debt.  
CVAS denotes Collateral values of Assets, measured by Fixed assets scaled by Total assets. NDTS 
denotes  Non-debt Tax shields, measured by Depreciation scaled by Total assets. PRFT  denotes 
Profitability, measured by EBIT scaled by Total assets. GRTH denotes Growth, measured by the 
firm market value scaled by book value. SIZE denotes Size, measured by natural logarithm of Total 
assets. 2. Columns (1) and (2) adopt Anderson and Hsiao (1981, 1982) estimation method, using 
2 - D t D  and 2 - t D  as the instrumental variable for  1 - D t D , respectively.   3. Column (3) adopts the 
two-step  Arellano  and  Bond  (1991)  GMM  estimation  method,  using  instruments: 
) ,..., , ( 1 3 2 i it it D D D - - and  t x D .  4. Column (4)  adopts  the  two-step Blundell and Bond (1998) 
GMM  system  estimation  method,  using  instruments:  ) ,..., , ( 1 3 2 i it it D D D - - and  t x D in  the 
differenced  equations  and  1 - D t D ,  t x  in  the  levels  equations.  5.  Year  dummies  variables  are 
included and first differences used in all specifications. 6.   *, ** and ***  indicate the coefficient 
significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 42 
Table 2. Regression results for Error Correction Model 
Dependent variable: Debt ratios 
MTD   MTD   MTD   MTD 




AH1/Diff   AH2/Diff   GMM/Diff   GMMsys/Diff 
1 - t D  0.626***   0.460***   0.391***   0.768*** 
 
(0.225)   (0.081)   (0.093)   (0.043) 
t CVAS  0.220***   0.250***   0.245***   0.214***  
(0.052)   (0.043)   (0.043)   (0.034) 
1 - t CVAS  -0.034***   -0.009   0.004   -0.130***  
(0.054)   (0.035)   (0.036)   (0.035) 
t NDTS  -0.538***   -0.472***   -0.429***   -0.339***  
(0.187)   (0.085)   (0.077)   (0.074) 
1 - t NDTS  -0.213**   -0.225***   -0.215***   -0.002  
(0.086)   (0.079)   (0.079)   (0.070) 
t PRFT  -0.077***   -0.075***   -0.067***   -0.056***  
(0.022)   (0.017)   (0.016)   (0.015) 
1 - t PRFT  -0.025**   -0.032**   -0.032**   0.006  
(0.012)   (0.013)   (0.013)   (0.012) 
t GRTH  -0.004***   -0.004***   -0.004***   -0.005***  
(0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001) 
1 - t GRTH  -0.001**   -0.002***   -0.002***   -0.001**  
(0.001)   (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.001) 
t SIZE  0.077***   0.072***   0.067***   0.053***  
(0.014)   (0.009)   (0.010)   0.009 
1 - t SIZE  -0.018   -0.016*   -0.013   -0.045  
(0.017)   (0.010)   (0.010)   (0.009) 
Instruments  2 - D t D   2 - t D   GMM    GMM System 
No of obs  2816   3675   3675   4534 
R-squared  -   -   -   - 
RSS  61.685   68.728   64.992   59.70 
Wald test 1   173(11)***   235(11)***   193(11)***   1880(11)*** 
Wald test 2   33.17(5)***   62.18(6)***   59.45(6)***   61.47(7)*** 
AR(1) test  -3.369***   -6.611***   -4.740***   -9.257*** 
AR(2) test  -1.815   -1.303   -1.355   -0.9202 
Sargan test   -   -   24.71(20)   21.35(19) 
Notes: 
1. See description of the measures of variables in Table 1 Note 1. 2. All the instruments used in 
columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) are exactly the same as those used in columns (1), (2), (3), (4), in Table 
1. In column (5), the GMM system instruments include:  ) ,..., , ( 5 3 2 - - - it it it D D D and  t x D in the 
differenced equations and  1 - D t D ,  t x  in the levels equations. 3. Year dummies are included and first 
differences used in all specifications. 4  *, ** and ***  indicate the coefficient significant at 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 43 
Table 3. Regression results for Trade-off, and Pecking Order Theory 










Net debt  
issued ratio 
 

















OLS   OLS 
 
OLS 
Constant  0.006***   0.002   0.018***   -0.013***   0.043*** 
 
(0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.002)   (0.002) 
t DEF  -   -   0.146***   0.322***   0.161***  
-   -   (0.029)   (0.053)   (0.025) 
) ( 1
*
- - t t D D  0.671***   -   -   -   -  




-   0.842***   -   -   -  
-   (0.069)   -   -   - 
) ( 1 1
*
- - - t t D D
 
-   0.649*** 
 
-   -   -  
-   (0.022)   -   -   - 
Instruments  None   None 
 
None   None   None 
No of obs  4534   4534   4534   5393   5393 
R-squared  0.350   0.352   0.064   0.320   0.089 
RSS  44.681   44.51   64.36   49.21   58.62 
Wald test 1   1033(1)***   1039(2)***   26.21(1)***   36.52(1)***   40.52(1)*** 
Wald test 2   31.94(1)***   1.953(1)   150.7(1)***   51.21(1)***   390.6(1)*** 
AR(1) test  5.535***   5.073***   -4.462***   -0.220   2.437** 
AR(2) test  -7.985***   -7.570***   -3.850***   0.839   2.735*** 
Notes: 
1.  Columns (1) and (2) adopt the two-stage estimation procedure to test the trade-off theory, under 
the partial adjustment and ECM framework, respectively. Columns (3), (4) and (5) test the pecking 
order theory.  
2. The dependent variable in each specification is defined as follows: In columns (1), (2) and (3), the 
dependent variable is the first differenced market value-based total debt ratio. In columns (4) and 
(5), the dependent variable is (i) the net debt issued and (ii) gross debt issued, both scaled by the sum 
of the market value of equity plus book value of total debt, respectively.  
3. t D
* is  the  fitted  value  of  the  dependent  variable  when  estimating  (III-3)  using  Within-group 
transformation method.  
4.  t DEF is computed using equation (III-10) and then scaled by either the sum of market value of 
equity plus book value of total debt. 
5. Year dummies are not included in any specifications. 
6  *, ** and ***  indicate the coefficient significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 44 
Table 4. Regression results for Trade-off vs. Pecking Order Theory 





































OLS   OLS   OLS   OLS 
Constant  -0.005***   -0.017***   0.046***   0.003**   -0.012***   0.049*** 
 
(0.001)   (0.002)   (0.003)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.003) 
t DEF  0.081***   0.313***   0.161***   0.078***   0.320***   0.165***  
(0.012)   (0.055)   (0.030)   (0.012)   (0.056)   (0.031) 
) ( 1
*
- - t t D D  0.640***   0.234***   0.038   -   -   -  




-   -   -   0.730***   -0.017   -0.123  
-   -   -   (0.065)   (0.063)   (0.100) 
) ( 1 1
*
- - - t t D D
 
-   - 
 
-   0.629***   0.264***   0.058*  
-   -   -   (0.022)   (0.022)   (0.031) 
Instruments  None   None 
 
None   None   None   None 
No of obs  4534   4534   4534   4534   4534   4534 
R-squared  0.369   0.390   0.092   0.369   0.395   0.09 
RSS  43.39   40.760   54.686   43.347   40.42   54.55 






1192(3)***   245(3)***   97.58(3)***
 














AR(1) test  4.534***   -0.155   2.235**   4.458***   -0.075   2.182** 
AR(2) test  -7.366***   -0.184   2.589**   -7.141***   0.259   2.605*** 
Notes: 
1. The dependent variable in each specification is defined as in Table 3, see its notes for more detail.  
2. Columns (1), (2) and (3) nest the partial adjustment model and pecking order model, using 
equation (III-11): 
it it PO it it it it v DEF D D D D + + - + = - - - b d a ) ( 1
*
1 
3. Columns (4), (5) and (6) nest the ECM and pecking order model, using the following equation: 





4. Year dummies are not included in any specifications. 
5  *, ** and ***  indicate the coefficient significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 45 
Table 5. Regression results for Trade-off vs. Pecking Order Theory 



































Constant  -0.045***   0.043***   0.044***   -0.040***   0.049***   0.045*** 
 
(0.015)   (0.011)   (0.009)   (0.015)   (0.010)   (0.009) 
1 - D t D  0.610***   0.410***   0.350***   0.566***   0.396***   0.295***  
(0.189)   (0.073)   (0.084)   (0.211)   (0.085)   (0.105) 
t DEF  0.146***   0.117***   0.120***   0.145***   0.114***   0.132***  
(0.045)   (0.035)   (0.034)   (0.043)   (0.034)   (0.035) 
t CVAS D
 
0.207***   0.223***   0.230***   0.209***   0.233***   0.231***  
(0.052)   (0.042)   (0.043)   (0.049)   (0.041)   (0.042) 
1 - D t CVAS  -   -   -   -0.042   -0.005   0.016  
-   -   -   (0.052)   (0.035)   (0.036) 
t NDTS D
 
-0.513***   -0.408***   -0.372***   -0.525***   -0.470***   -0.426***  
(0.187)   (0.080)   (0.070)   (0.185)   (0.078)   (0.070) 
1 - D t NDTS  -   -   -   -0.190**   -0.210***   -0.208***  
-   -   -   (0.087)   (0.075)   (0.069) 
t PRFT D
 
-0.053***   -0.050***   -0.046***   -0.061***   -0.065***   -0.057***  
(0.020)   (0.015)   (0.015)   (0.020)   (0.016)   (0.015) 
1 - D t PRFT  -   -   -   -0.018   -0.026**   -0.028**  
-   -   -   (0.012)   (0.013)   (0.013) 
t GRTH D
 
-0.003***   -0.003***   -0.003***   -0.004***   -0.004***   -0.004***  
(0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001) 
1 - D t GRTH  -   -   -   -0.001***   -0.001***   0.002***  
-   -   -   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
t SIZE D
 
0.042***   0.0043***   0.041***   0.047***   0.050***   0.041***  
(0.014)   (0.011)   (0.011)   (0.014)   (0.010)   (0.011) 
1 - D t SIZE  -   -   -   -0.018   -0.016*   -0.012  
-   -   -   (0.016)   (0.008)   (0.009) 
Instruments  2 - D t D 
 




2 - D t D 
 
2 - t D 
 
GMM 
No of obs  2816   3675   3675   2816   3675   3675 
R-squared  -   -   -   -   -   - 
RSS  59.190   64.748   61.728   56.42   63.48   58.82 









151(12)***   246(12)***   213(12)*** 

















AR(1) test  -3.893   -5.989***   -4.599***   -3.282***   -5.463***   -3.431*** 
AR(2) test  -1.911*   -1.200   -1.201   -1.966**   -1.293   -1.362 
Sargan test   -   - 
 
25.56(20)   -   -   30.09(20)* 
Notes:  1. Year dummies are not included in any specifications. 2. *, ** and ***  indicate the 
coefficient significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 